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Abstract​. Mathematical formalisms that are constructed for inquiry in one 
disciplinary context are sometimes applied to another, a phenomenon that I call 
‘tool migration.’ Philosophers of science have addressed the advantages of using 
migrated tools. In this paper, I argue that tool migration can be epistemically 
risky. I then develop an analytic framework for better understanding the risks that 
are implicit in tool migration. My approach shows that viewing mathematical 
constructs as tools while also acknowledging their representational features 
allows for a balanced understanding of knowledge production that are aided by 
the research tools migrated across disciplinary boundaries. 
 
Keywords​: Cross-disciplinarity, tool migration, epistemic risks 
 
1. Introduction 
Mathematical formalisms that are constructed for scientific inquiry in one disciplinary (or 
sub-disciplinary) context are applied to another.  Philosophers of science have started paying 
attention to this cross-disciplinary aspect of scientific practice.  For instance, the discussion of 
'model transfer' concerns a relatively small set of mathematical models that are applied in 
multiple disciplinary contexts. Humphreys (2004) proposes that models that are transferred to 
study phenomena of a different domain owe their versatility to the computational tractability 
they afford. In contrast, Knuuttila and Loettger (2014, 2016) suggest that in addition to 
tractability, versatile models also offer conceptual frameworks for theorization, which they label 
'model templates.' However, these analyses do not deal with the risks inherent in this aspect of 
scientific practice. Consider the use and development of game theory in evolutionary biology as 
an example. In importing game theory, which was originally conceived to describe strategic 
interaction between rational agents typically studied by social scientists, evolutionary biologists 
may need to modify the theory in order to generate knowledge about presumably non-rational 
agents, at least in many cases. One can then assume that any changes to the theory--between its 
established applications in social sciences and its novel uses in evolutionary biology--require 
special attention so as to avoid misinterpreting an analysis. 
Despite the advantages, there might be risks associated with using mathematical 
constructs across disciplines. In this paper, I ask: might there be patterns of transfer that may 
undermine the effectiveness of the imported mathematical formulation? What would these 
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patterns, if any, look like? This paper is an attempt to explore the conditions in which importing 
mathematical constructs may be epistemically risky. To begin, I develop a framework to 
systematically characterize the landscape of mathematical importations. The goal of such a 
framework is two-fold. Proximately, the framework captures characteristics of migration that the 
current terminology, such as 'model transfer' or 'importing/exporting,' fails to discern. Ultimately, 
with this additional discernibility, I suggest that one may start to explore and identify patterns of 
importation that may be subject to epistemic risks, such as misinterpretation of an outcome 
produced by using a imported mathematical construct. 
In Section 2, I argue that one can view mathematical constructs in science in terms of 
'research tools' and that transporting such tools across disciplines, which I call 'tool migration,' 
can in some cases be a disservice to science. Next, I classify tool migration based on two kinds 
of contextual details that bear significance to the effectiveness of the migrated research tool in a 
foreign context. ​In Section 3, I​ apply this approach to the use and development of game theory in 
evolutionary biology. Finally, in Section 4, I discuss in what ways this tool migration framework, 
which is essentially a typology of four types of tool migration, may help to characterize 
epistemically risky patterns of tool migration. 
 
2. Theoretical Background 
Although the notion of epistemic risks associated with migration of mathematical constructs has 
not been explicitly addressed, the idea of viewing mathematical constructs as research tools 
follows from the discussion on the ontology of scientific models. Ever since the shift of attention 
to scientific practice (e.g., Hacking 1983), there has been a growing literature in which models in 
science are viewed as entities ​detachable​ from theory and data (e.g., Morrison 1999; Morgan and 
Morrison 1999). One recent predecessor to my tool migration account is a pragmatic approach to 
scientific models put forth by Boon and Knuuttila (2008). In their paper, which uses examples 
from engineering, they argue that scientific models are better understood as ʻepistemic toolsʼ 
instead of as representations of some target systems in the world. Boon and Knuuttila's argument 
draws heavily on the epistemological roles of scientific models in relation to the scientists who 
use them. According to them, scientific models allow their users “to understand, predict, or 
optimize the behavior of devices or the properties of diverse materials” (2008, 687). Thus, for an 
ontological account of scientific models to be productive and realistic, as they argue, it should be 
sensitive to the relation between the models and the modelers, i.e., the tools and their users. An 
adequate evaluation of Boon and Knuuttila's argument will take us far afield, but my work will 
show that both the representational and the pragmatic aspects are indispensable to a better 
understanding of the epistemic risks in tool migration.  
 
2.1 Viewing mathematical constructs as research tools 
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In general terms, any mathematical construct that is to be ​used or operated​ in an algorithmic 
manner, and the outcome of whose operation is to be ​interpreted​ in order to answer a research 
question, is an example of what I am calling a research tool. Let me first unpack the operational 
aspect of a research tool. 
Let's assume that the proper use of any mathematical constructs employed in scientific 
research is expected to produce consistent results. To achieve this consistency, then, a 
well-defined procedure needs to accompany such a construct so that anyone who follows the 
procedure expects, and is expected, to obtain the same outcome given the same input. For 
instance, when performing a game-theoretic analysis, one goes through a sequence of steps, such 
as: (i) identify the players and the acts available to them, (ii) identify the payouts in every set of 
acts, (iii) find the ‘Nash equilibria,’ which refers to a set of acts, one for each player, in which no 
player could improve his or her payoff by unilaterally changing act. A similar algorithmic 
procedure can be seen when applying, say, Newton's law of gravitation: 
.F grav = G r2
m m1 2 (1.1) 
For example, the sequence of steps to obtain the magnitude of the gravitational force, ​F​grav​, 
between any two objects includes: (i) identify the mass of each object, (ii) identify the distance 
between them, (iii) complete the equation in which ʻ​m​1​ʼ and ʻ​m​2​ʼ refer to the masses of the two 
objects, ʻ ​r​ʼ the distance in between, and ʻGʼ the gravitational constant. In these two examples, 
when the first two steps produce consistent input, the third step is expected to generate the same 
output. 
Moreover, concerning the interpretational aspect of a research tool, the output of a series 
of symbol assignments and manipulations can be understood ​only through the lens of some 
interpretation​. The Nash-equilibrium of a game is a meaningful 'solution' in virtue of the usual 
understanding of the game-theoretic formulation of a problem. Similarly, the meaning of the 
value obtained through completing the equation in (1.1) is derived from the usual interpretation 
of the quantities appearing in the equation and the theoretical context in which those quantities 
are defined. 
Finally, assume that something can be viewed as a tool if it serves as a means to an end. 
In this case, then, mathematical constructs like game theory or mathematical formulas can be 
seen as research tools. In the case of applying a mathematical construct, the goal of performing a 
sequence of prescribed steps goes beyond merely completing the calculation and obtaining a 
result. Instead, the output is to be interpreted so that one may solve a problem, answer a research 
question, or gain knowledge about a subject-matter. Thus, a mathematical construct that 
prescribes algorithmic symbol manipulation can be seen as a research tool, assisting its users to 
meet an end. Manipulating symbols is a means to the end that was specified during the 
mathematical formulation of the research problem. 
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2.2 Epistemic risks of tool migration 
Another predecessor to my account is Morgan's discussion of the re-situating of knowledge 
(2014). According to her, knowledge production is necessarily 'situated,' and consequently, 
applying a piece of knowledge outside its initial context requires effort - different contextual 
situations require different 're-situating' strategies. The term 're-situation' thus captures what 
scientists do in practice to transport locally generated knowledge across contexts. As she argues, 
to make an instance of scientific knowledge accessible outside its production site, one needs to 
establish inferential links between the production site and the destination site. However, she 
suggests, whether a re-situation of knowledge contributes to scientific progress depends on 
whether the transport secures some sort of inferential safety. 
Building from Morgan's notion of the re-situation of knowledge, I argue that 
cross-disciplinary use of research tools is epistemically risky. Given the locality of scientific 
knowledge production, applying scientific knowledge outside its production site may come with 
epistemic risks. For example, between the production site and a destination site, there may be 
incongruent disciplinary characteristics (e.g., implicit theoretical assumptions) that fail to be 
captured by the inferential strategy, such that knowledge from the former cannot be transferred 
to the latter. Similarly, we can assume that the construction of a research tool is also ​situated ​in 
nature. Namely, a research tool is conceived to be operated and to extend our knowledge 
concerning a subject-matter ​given a particular disciplinary context​. It follows that 
cross-disciplinary use of research tools is as epistemically risky as re-situating knowledge. That 
is, the epistemic reliability (i.e., general ability or tendency to produce knowledge) of some 
research tool in one disciplinary context does not necessarily carry over to another. 
The concept of 'tool migration' captures both the 'situated-ness' of a research tool that was 
established in its native discipline and the effort it takes to 're-situate' the tool in a foreign 
discipline. Naturally, in the process of uprooting a research tool, significant contextual 
details—ranging from implicit expertise to important background assumptions—may be stripped 
away. Likewise, during re-situation, new features may be introduced to the tool so as to treat a 
different subject matter in a new disciplinary context. Together, due to the possibility of losing or 
gaining significant contextual details, or both, a cross-disciplinary tool migration risks 
undermining the effectiveness of the tool. These risks include, for example, misinterpretation of 
the research result or failure to produce genuine knowledge. Thus, it follows that tool migration 
can in some cases be a disservice to the production of knowledge. 
Acknowledging these challenges, some have argued against the cross-disciplinary effort 
to integrate disciplinary knowledge (e.g., van der Steen 1993). Alternatively, one might try to 
overcome these challenges so long as the risks are better understood and managed. To 
understand the risks, I suggest that we first look at the patterns of tool migration. Among these 
patterns, we might find that some of them could be epistemically risky. Having established the 
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notions of research tools and risks involved with tool migration, I turn to the contextual details 
that are closely related to a tool's epistemic performance. 
 
2.3 Contextual details of a research tool: the target profile and the usage profile 
The construction of a research tool is necessarily situated within a context. In order to compare 
and contrast between the native (or established) context and the foreign context of a migrated 
tool, I single out two major types of details. 
The first type concerns the assumptions about the entities that are studied by a 
subject-matter for which the tool is developed. For instance, game theory defines what it 
considers as a game, a player, or an act. For simplicity, I call ​all​ the assumptions that a tool 
makes about its target entities the tool’s 'target profile.'  
The second type considers ​the ways​ in which one interprets the output from applying a 
tool in his or her research. In a game-theoretic analysis, for example, by following an algorithmic 
procedure, one obtains a solution of a game in the form of a Nash equilibrium. Depending on the 
game that one was analyzing, the solution could be understood as an explanation of economic 
behavior, or a prediction about it, or it could be used to optimize an strategic interaction. For 
simplicity, I call ​all​ the ways in which a tool is intended to be used, e.g., describing, predicting, 
optimizing, or explaining its target phenomenon, the tool's 'usage profile.' 
Together, as I demonstrate in Section 4, the 'target profile' and 'usage profile' allow one to 
detect patterns of changes in the contextual details between the established use and the novel use 
of a research tool. They are able to do this because these two profiles offer a coarse resolution; 
looking through the lens of the target profile and usage profile, one zooms out from particular 
cases of tool migration so as to detect patterns of cross-disciplinary transport. Further analyses of 
these patterns will then shed lights on their associated epistemic risks. 
 
2.4 Four types of tool migration 
With the two profiles of a research tool and the two contexts in which the tool is used, i.e., a 
novel use and an established use, one can distinguish four types of tool migration.  
First, compared to its established use, when a novel use of a tool catalyzes changes in 
both target and usage profiles, the tool migration is transformative, and therefore I call it a 
tool-transformation​. Second, in contrast, when both target and usage profiles remain more or 
less intact after the migration, the tool's novel use is considerably similar to its previous 
applications. Thus, I call such a case ​tool-application​. Between these two extreme types, there 
are novel uses of a research tool that alter only one of the two profiles but not both. When a tool 
changes its target profile but not its usage profile, I call it a ​tool-transfer​, ​and when a tool 
changes its usage profile but not the target profile, I call it a ​tool-adaptation​. See ​Table 1​ for a 
summary. 
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Table 1 
A Typology of Tool Migration 
Between established 
and novel uses of a 
research tool 
Usage profile remains Usage profile deviates 
Target profile remains 'Tool-application' 'Tool-adaptation' 
Target profile deviates 'Tool-transfer' 'Tool-transformation' 
 
Among these four types of tool migration, tool-transfer is arguably the most familiar to 
the philosophers of science. Humphreys coins the term ʻcomputational templatesʼ to refer to a 
relatively small number of mathematical equations that are applied to investigate different 
domains of phenomena (2002, 2004). Bailer-Jones (2009) discusses such a scientific practice in 
terms of mathematical analogy. For one example, Newton's law of gravitation was intentionally 
sought after to model electrostatic force (see Bailer-Jones 2009 for a detailed account). The 
important parallel between the two formulas, shown in (1.2), is that both types of forces 
(gravitational and the electrostatic) are proportional to the inverse of the square of the distance, ​r​, 
between two masses, ​m​1​ and ​m​2​, or two charges, ​q​1​ and ​q​2​. The constants that appear in both 
formulas scale the quantities to match empirical phenomena. 
   ​andF grav = G r2
m m1 2 F el = k r2
q q1 2 (1.2) 
In contrast, the other three types of tool migration, despite prominent examples, are less 
explored in regard to their general features. One prominent example of tool-transformation is the 
development of game theory to be used in evolutionary biology. 
 
3.  The Migration of Game Theory From Social Sciences to Biology 
In this section, I show in what sense the novel use of game theory in evolutionary biology, which 
is now known as 'evolutionary game theory' ('EGT') can be considered as a tool-transformation. I 
should mention that my account of the migration of game theory in this paper is not meant to 
address all the limitations of both game theory and EGT in their respective disciplinary contexts. 
Instead, the purpose of this account is to show that one ​can​ detect patterns of migration that have 
epistemic implications by focusing on the target profile and usage profile of a research tool. 
 
3.1 Game theory in social sciences 
Game theory was initially formulated to mathematically model strategic interactions between 
intelligent, rational agents. In game theory, a game is defined as an interaction between two or 
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more players in which each player's payoff (e.g., profit) is affected by the decisions made by 
other players. Typically, such a game assumes both ​perfect information ​and ​common knowledge. 
Perfect information​ assumes that​ ​all players know the entire structure of the game (all moves and 
all payouts) as well as all previous moves made by all players in the game (if it is an iterated or 
multi-move game).​ Common​ ​knowledge​ is the assumption that all players know that all players 
have perfect information, and that all players know that all players know that all players have 
perfect information, and so on. That is, ​common​ knowledge concerns what players know about 
what other players know. Moreover, the players also recognize that all players are cognizant that 
all players are rational, i.e., there is common knowledge of the game and of the ​unbounded 
rationality​ of all players. As such, all players will act in the way that takes all other players' 
potential moves into account in order to maximize their odds of winning. In addition to these 
assumptions regarding the players of a game, the structure of a game, which refers to the 
combinations of each move and its payout, is usually summarized in a 'payoff matrix.' Typically, 
an analysis of a game aims to find out its 'solution,' a unique Nash equilibrium (or sometimes 
equilibria) of the game. 
Game theory has been used in economics, as well as other social sciences, to describe, 
predict, optimize, or explain a variety of human interactions, such as the economic behaviors of 
firms, markets, and consumers (e.g., Brandenburger and Nalebuff 1995; Casson 1994) military 
decisions (Haywood 1954) or international politics (e.g., Snidal 1985). 
 
3.2 Game theory in evolutionary biology 
Game theory was later used in evolutionary biology, where a game is understood as phenotypes 
(or heritable traits) in contest. In 1973, John Maynard Smith and George Price borrowed the 
formalism of a payoff matrix from game theory to mathematically model the evolution of 
phenotype frequencies in a population of organisms (see Grüne-Yanoff 2011). Their modeling 
method assumed that phenotypes are in contest with other phenotypes in a population of 
organisms. For instance, in a Hawk-Dove game, the contest is embodied by organisms with the 
phenotype of being aggressive and other organisms that are peaceful. In such a context, the 
payoff of a move is interpreted as the reproductive success of the phenotype (i.e., the number of 
copies it will leave to the next generation). Moreover, while the terminology such as 'game,' 
'payoffs' and the formalism of a payoff matrix can be seen in the novel use of game theory in 
biology, the solution to a game in evolutionary biology is decidedly different from the 
Nash-equilibrium. An evolutionary game theoretic analysis typically looks for an evolutionarily 
stable strategy (ESS), i.e., a distribution of phenotypes in a population that is stable. 
 
3.3 Epistemic implications of tool transformation 
It is clear that the target profile of game theory is no longer the same between its established use 
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in social sciences and its novel use in biology. First, none of the assumptions of ​perfect 
information​,​ common knowledge​, and ​unbounded rationality ​in what is now known classical 
game theory (CGT) remain in the novel use of game theory in biology. Second, the moves in 
EGT are heritable phenotypes exhibited by a group of organisms instead of acts available to 
players. Third, the payoffs in EGT are the reproductive success of the heritable traits. In this 
sense, the three assumptions concerning the players were stripped away from the tool - as a result 
of uprooting game theory from social sciences, and the ​heritability​ assumption about the moves 
as well as Darwinian fitness interpretation of the payoff were introduced to the tool - as a result 
of re-situating it to evolutionary biology. 
Note that the change in the target profile forces a limitation to the usage profile of the 
migrated tool. For instance, nullifying the ​unbounded rationality​ assumption concerning the 
players, EGT can no longer be used to optimize a game, i.e., discovering the rationally optimal 
strategy, which is a common use of game theory in social sciences. For instance, in the prisoner's 
dilemma, the Nash-equilibrium is for both players to defect. This solution is often interpreted as 
a prescription for the game; the players are irrational not to defect. However, in a Hawk-Dove 
game, the ESS obviously has no such normative use. Because the 'moves' of being an aggressive 
type or a peaceful type are not 'chosen,' the idea of there being normatively better or worse 
choice of moves is therefore questionable. Moreover, the organisms are not assumed to be 
rational. Thus, while the players in the prisoner's dilemma could be said to be irrational for 
choosing to cooperate, this sense of normativity does not carry over to the evolutionary game 
theoretic analysis of the Hawk-Dove game. One would be mistaken to say that it is ‘irrational’ 
for the doves to be doves. Thus, the change in the target-profile of game theory, especially the 
stripping away of the ​unbounded rationality​ assumption, has resulted in how the migrated tool 
should or should not be used.  1
Moreover, applying EGT to study social phenomena (e.g., Axelrod 1984) or cultural 
evolution (e.g., Skyrms 2010) requires a careful re-defining of the terms (such as fitness) so as to 
avoid misinterpretation. Using EGT in social sciences, which can be considered as a 
ʻhomecomingʼ of the migrated tool, is not uncommon. However, the notion of payoffs in EGT 
refers to, roughly, the overall biological reproductive success of a group of organisms that 
exhibit a phenotype. Obviously in a social context, reproductive success of the members of some 
group is not, very often, the feature of interest. A careful reinterpretation of payoffs is thus 
needed in every analysis to prevent misleading conclusions.  
1 ​Of course, a more interesting prescriptive use of the ESS of a Hawk-Dove game might be, for 
example, to manage ecosystems for optimal predator-prey balance. Nevertheless, it should be 
noted that a justification for this type of prescriptive use of EGT would require further analysis 
because it is apparently not be derived from CGT. 
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To generalize, this example suggests that at least in some cases, a change in the target 
profile requires a corresponding change in the usage profile, or failure of producing genuine 
knowledge may follow. So far, I have shown that a solution of an ESS analysis may not be 
interpreted as an optimization to a Hawk-Dove game. Applying EGT to study social phenomena 
also requires careful treatment to the notion of payoff. Now if, hypothetically, some researcher 
were to make either of these two mistakes, his or her novel use of the tool would have been 
classified as tool-transfer - the novel use changes only the target profile without also changing 
the usage profile. It suggests that in some cases, tool-transformation may not be as risky as 
tool-transfer. I will come back to the issue of tool-transfer after some remarks related to the 
migration of game theory. 
  
4. Contributions of the Tool Migration Analysis 
The tool migration typology and its focus on tracking both similarities and differences meets the 
needs to sharpen discussions concerning inter- or cross-disciplinary use of research tools. 
Current literature seems to lack a framework to capture important, relational characteristics of 
the research tools that appear in multiple disciplinary contexts. For instance, 'tool-transformation' 
captures significant differences in details between CGT and EGT without losing sight of the 
contextual relationship between the two. In contrast, other terms in the literature, such as 
'imports' or 'transfers,' fall short of doing so. 
'Imports' signals the importation of research tools from a foreign discipline. In contrast, 
'transfers' refers to the use of a scientific model, which was established to study phenomena of 
one domain, to study phenomena of a different domain. Neither term captures the migration of 
game theory to biology. As Grüne-Yanoff argues, 
[B]iologists constructed the more sophisticated formal [evolutionary game 
theoretic] concepts themselves. One could speak of the import of formal concepts 
only with respect to very basic notions such as strategies or pay-off matrices, and 
it may be more appropriate to refer to formal inspirations rather than imports or 
transfers in these contexts. (2011, 392) 
Moreover, I have suggested that a change in a tool's target profile without a 
corresponding change in the tool's usage profile ​may​ lead to misinterpretation and hence misuse 
of the tool. If this observation is generalizable, which is debatable, then it follows that cases of 
tool-transfer are epistemically riskier than cases of tool-transformation. On the other hand, if this 
observation applies only to some cases, it nevertheless reveals at least two epistemic implications 
concerning tool migration: 1) when the target profile changes, one must be careful not to draw 
conclusions that might be natural in the old context but may not make sense within the new 
context, given the new target, and 2) sometimes a change in target profile can, force a change in 
usage profile. Potentially failing to recognize when these changes occurred in a migration leads 
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to risky uses of the migrated tool. 
Morgan (2011) has argued that while not all scientific knowledge travels far, those that 
travel with integrity (i.e., maintaining their content more or less intact during its travels) and 
travel fruitfully (i.e., finding new users or new functions) are considered to be traveling well. It is 
relatively easy to quantify the latter feature – one needs to look at just the number of a tool's 
novel applications. However, determining whether a tool has traveled with integrity is not 
straightforward. As a starting point, this proposed tool migration framework—especially its 
distinction between the target profile and the usage profile of a tool—provides a starting point 
that is crucial for assessing the integrity of a migrated research tool. With this framework, one 
may discover more patterns of tool migration that impact the epistemic integrity and, 
consequently, effectiveness of a migrated research tool in a foreign discipline. 
 
5. Conclusion 
I have argued that mathematical constructs used in science can be viewed as research tools and 
their cross-disciplinary novel use as tool migration. I have also argued that making novel use of 
established tools has its risks, but such an implication is not meant to deter cross-disciplinary 
sharing of tools. Indeed, certain important breakthroughs in the history of science are due to 
creative, unconventional, uses of research tools (e.g., the use of Fourier's mathematical treatment 
of heat to study electrostatics [Thomson 1842] or the use of Faraday's mechanical model of fluid 
motion to model the electromagnetic field [Maxwell 1861]). Versatile research tools are not rare 
in science. A framework of tool migration aims to offer not only a useful terminology to 
characterize the diverse landscape of their versatility but also a groundwork to investigate risky 
patterns of making novel use of established research tools. Finally, this tool migration approach 
shows that viewing these constructs as tools whilst acknowledging their representational features 
(i.e., as captured in their target profile) allows for a balanced understanding of knowledge 
production - especially those productions that are aided by research tools that have migrated 
across disciplinary boundaries.  
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